Información General

• Materias correlativas: Cálculo Avanzado - Probabilidades y Estadística.


• Primera parte:
  • Juegos Combinatorios: Definición. Imparcial vs. partisano; normal vs. misere. Posiciones P y N. Representación en grafos. Teorema de Zermelo. Función de Sprague-Grundy. Teorema de S-G. Nim. Nímeros.
  • Juegos de suma cero: Definición, forma normal, estrategias dominadas. Estrategias mixtas. Niveles de seguridad. Teorema Minimax de von Neumann.
  • Teoría no cooperativa: forma y estratégica. Equilibrio de Nash. Teoremas de Punto Fijo.
  • Teoría cooperativa: utilidades transferibles y no transferibles. Nucleo, nucleolo y valor de Shapley.
  • Sociales: Teorema de Arrow. Matching
  
  
• Segunda parte:
  • nunca fueron buenas.

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  Importante

  • Inscripción. Para ser incluido en las Actas de Trabajos Prácticos, en caso de aprobarlos, es necesario haberse inscripto en la materia (Sistema de Inscripciones) y completar la encuesta de evaluación docente.
  • Se recuerda que es obligatorio leer las ||.||_(higiene) + ||.||_(seguridad).
  
  

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  Régimen de promoción

  Para firmar los trabajos prácticos se debe aprobar el examen parcial. Habrá una fecha de recuperación al final del cuatrimestre.

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  Docente(s), aulas y horarios

  Teórica	Miércoles: 14:30 a 17	Juan Pablo Pinasco	Aula: 8	Pab: I
  Práctica	Miércoles: 14 a 14:30	Lucía Chiappara y Juan Pablo Pinasco	Aula: 8	Pab: I
  Práctica	Lunes: 14 a 17	Lucía Chiappara	Aula: 6	Pab: I

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  Prácticas

  Las prácticas son cuatro:
  • Práctica 1. Juegos Combinatorios.
  • Práctica 2. Dos jugadores, suma cero.
  • Práctica 3. Juegos generales (no cooperativos).
  • Práctica 4. Teoría cooperativa.

  Estos archivos pueden verse e imprimirse usando Acrobat Reader o Xpdf.

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  Parciales

  Parcial: Miércoles 3 de Noviembre. Aula Magna, Pab. I - 14 a 17 horas.
  
  Recuperatorio: ?? Día, horario y aula a confirmar.

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  Bibliografía

  Game Theory
  Thomas S. Ferguson
  Mathematics Department, UCLA
  http://www.math.ucla.edu/~tom/Game_Theory/Contents.html
  
  

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  Finales

  Se puede rendir un final teórico práctico sobre los temas de la primera parte, o exponer uno de los siguientes trabajos (elija de acuerdo a su avance en la carrera).
  
  Contacte a Cristian Scarola por el paper elegido.
  
  Temas:
  1. Aprendizaje (A. Blum, Y. Mansour, "Learning, regret minimization and equilibria").[Comp]
  2. Bayesianos: antes de un duelo, ¿desayunar con un whisky o con un actimel? (Kockesen p. 117; ver S. Zamir, "Bayesian Games: Games with Incomplete Information", Discussion paper 486 (2008)).
  3. Cómo repartir una torta (F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, "How to cut a pizza fairly". Social Welfare 20 (2003) 457-465).
  4. Duopolios. Bertrand, Cournot, Stackelberg.
  5. Funciones de utilidad y pólizas de seguros.[GRAL]
  6. A. Galeotti, S. Goyal, M. Jackson, F. Vega-Redondo, L. Yariv, "Network games" 2008
  7. Heladeros en la playa (Hotelling) y la tragedia de los comunes. R. E. Marks, "Competition and common property", AGSM Working Paper 98-003 (1998).
  8. M. Jackson, "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency" (2003).
  9. Juegos de congestión (Monderer and Shapley, "Potential games", Games and Economic Behavior 14 (1996), 124-143). [Comp]
  10. Juegos repetidos con descuento y teoremas Folk (Ratliff; Kockesen p. 104; ver J. Benoit, V. Krishna, "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis").
  11. Juegos simétricos, invariantes por las acción de un grupo (Ferguson).[Algebra]
  12. S. Morris, H. Song Shin, "Global Games: Theory and Applications", (2001).
  13. Poker de Borel y de von Neumann. All in players (Ferguson; ver R. Bellman, "On games involving bluffing", Rend. Circolo Mat. Palermo 1 (1952) 139-156.).
  14. Stripped-down Poker (Reiley, Urbancic, Walker; Señalización, Bluff).
  15. Subastas (Binmore, Playing for Real; L. Kockesen p. 46 y p.73; ver M. Chwe, "The discrete bid first auction", Econ. Lett. 31 (1989) 303-306.).
  16. A. Neyman, "From Markov Chains to Stochastic Games", "Stochastic Games: the Existence of the Minimax".[Proba]
  17. R. Myerson, "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory", Discussion paper no. 1162 (1996) Northwestern Univ.
  18. M. Shubik, "Games of Status", Behavorial Sci. 18 (1971) 117-129. [GRAL]
  19. M. Shubik, "Gaming and Game Theory", Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers (1971).
  20. M. Shubik, "Some Simple Games for Teaching and Research. Part 1: Cooperative Games" Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1174, Yale University.[Prof]
  
  Primera fuerte:
  1. G. Akerlof, "The Market for Lemons. Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", The Quat. J. of Economics 84 (1970) 488-500.
  2. G. Akerlof, "Social Distance and Social Decisions", Econometrica 65 (1997) 1005-1027.
  3. S. Alpern, "The telephone coordination game", 2000.
  4. S. Alpern, "Assymetric Rendezvous Search on the Circle", 1999.
  5. O. Amantier, "Does observation influence learning?", Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004) 221-239.[Prof]
  6. R. Aumann, L. Shapley, "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis", UCLA Working Papers 676 (1992) 1-27.
  7. M. Chwe, "Why were workers whipped? Pain in a principal-agent model", The Economic Journal 100 (1990) 1109-1121.[Prof; trabajo infantil y esclavitud]
  8. M. Dreef, P. Borm, B. van der Genugten, "Measuring Skill in Games: Several Approaches Discussed", (2003)
  9. P. Dubey, J. Geanakoplos, "Grading Exams: 100, 99, 98,... or A, B, C?", [Prof]
  10. I. Eshel, "On a Prey-Predator Nonzero-Sum Game and the Evolution of Gregarious Behavior of Evasive Prey", The American Naturalist 112 (1978) 787-795.[ode]
  11. A. Fraenkel, "The Raleigh game" INTEGERS, Electr. J. Combinat. Number Theory 7(2007) 1-11.[Algebra1]
  12. A. Fraenkel, "Euclid and Wythoff games", Discrete Math. 304 (2005) 65-68.
  13. A. Fraenkel, A. Kontorovich, "The Sierpinski sieve of Nim-varieties and binomial coefficients", INTEGERS, Electr. J. Combinat. Number Theory 7 (2007) 1-19.
  14. C. Holt, M. Capra, "Classroom Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma", The Journal of Economic Education, 31 (2000) 229-236.[Prof]
  15. L. Luthi, E. Pestelacci, M. Tomassini, "Evolutionary Dilemmas in a Social Network", Advances in Artificial Life (2007) 545-554 (ver "Social dilemmas and cooperation in complex networks").
  16. R. Myerson, "Graphs and cooperation in games", Math. of Oper. Research, 2 (1977) 225-229.[Aplicada/Comp]
  17. A. Neyman, "Stochastic Games and Nonexpansive Maps" [Funcional].
  18. G. Oshanina, O. Vasilyevc, P. L. Krapivskye and J. Klafterf, "Survival of an evasive prey", Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 106 (2009) 13696-13701.[ode]
  19. S. Pinker, M. Nowak, J. Lee, "The logic of indirect speech" PNAS 105 (2008) 833-838.[GRAL]
  20. D. Ridley, "Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information", 2008.
  21. S. Sahi, M. Shubik "A Model of a Sudden-Death Field-Goal Football Game as a Sequential Duel". Math. Social Sci. 15 (1988) 205-215.
  22. T. Schelling, "Dynamic Models of Segregation", J. of Math. Sociology 1 (1971) 143-186.
  23. C. Schulze, D. Stauffer, S. Wichmann, "Birth, survival and death of languages by Monte Carlo simulation", 2007 (ver Stauffer, "Opinion Dynamics and Sociophysics").
  24. L. Shapley, J. Palamara, "Simple Games and Authority Structure", UCLA Working Paper 796 (2000) 1-23.
  25. M. Shayo, A. Harel, "Non-Consequentialist Voting" 2010.
  26. M. Shubik, "Game Theory models of strategic behavior and nuclear deterrence", Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 525, Yale University (1987).[GRAL]
  27. M. Shubik, "The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes And Some Experimental Games", Simulation Gaming 33 (2002) 139-156.[Prof]
  28. B. Skinner, "The Price of Anarchy in Basketball", Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports 6 (2010) 1-9 (junto con la paradoja de Braess).[Comp]
  29. J. Tallon, S. Zamir, J. Vergnaud, "Contradicting Beliefs and Communication".
  
  Maestro:
  1. K. Arrow, "Discounting, Morality, and Gaming", en "Discounting and intergenerational equity", P. Portney, J. Weyant.
  2. G. Asheim, M. Dufwenberg, "Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games", The Economic Journal 113 (2003) 305-325.
  3. R. Aumann, J. Dreze, "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?", Discussion Paper Series (2005).
  4. R. Aumann, W. Gueth, "Species Survival and Evolutionary Stability in Sustainable Habitats", Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10 (2000) 437-447.
  5. R. Aumann, S. Hart, "Long Cheap Talk", Econometrica 71 (2003) 1619-1660
  6. R. Aumann, "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality", Econometrica 55 (1987) 1-18.
  7. R. Aumann, S. Hart and M. Perry, "The Absent-Minded Driver", Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997) 102-116 y "The Forgetful Passenger", Games and Economic Behavior 20 (1997) 117-120 (ver M Piccione, A. Rubinstein, "The Absent-Minded Driver s Paradox: Synthesis and Responses" Games and Econ. Behavior 20 (1997) 121-130).
  8. R. Aumann, "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), pp. 67-96.
  9. S. Baliga, T. Sjostrom, "The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict" 2009.
  10. A. Berentsen, E Brugger, S. Lortscher, "On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing", (2003)
  11. D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, J. Massó, A. Neme, "On exiting after voting", Int. J. Game Theory 34 (2006) 33-54 (ver "Stability...".
  12. A. Blum, M. Hajiaghayi, K. Ligett, A. Roth, "Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy", Proc. 40th ACM symposium on Theory of Computing 2008.[Comp]
  13. B. Bollobas, I. Leader, M. Walters, "Lion and Man – Can Both Win?", Preprint 2009.[Avanzado]
  14. P. Borm, H. Hamers, R. Hendrickx, "Operations Research Games: A Survey", TOP 9 (2001) 139-199. [Aplicada/Comp]
  15. Y. Bramoullé, R. Kranton, M. D'Amours, "Strategic Interaction and Networks" (2010)
  16. S. Brykalov, "A Game with Program Control and Variable Terminal Moment", Int. Report (1999) 1-10.[ode]
  17. A. Casella, T. Palfrey and R. Riezman, "Minorities and Storable Votes", Quarterly Journal of Political Science 3 (2008) 165-200.
  18. J. Cesco, A. Calí, "Una solución dinámica para juegos con utilidades transferibles", Preprint 2005.
  19. D. Cherkashin, J.D. Farmer, S. Lloyd, "The reality game", J. of Economic Dynamics and Control 33 (2009) 1091-1105.
  20. G. Chichilnisky, "The Topology of Fear", Preprint 2009.[Topol]
  21. S. Chowdhury, R. Sheremeta, "A generalized Tullock contest" Public Choice, to appear.
  22. P. Dal Bo, "Three Essays on Repeated Games", primer capítulo. Ph.D. Thesis UCLA 2002.
  23. P. Dubey and L. Shapley, "Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models", J. of Mathematical Economics Volume 23 (1994) 253-293.
  24. E. Duchene, A.S. Fraenkel, S. Gravier and R.J. Nowakowski, Another bridge between Nim and Wythoff, Australasian J. of Combinatorics 44 (2009), 43-56.
  25. U. Dulleck, "The E-Mail Game Revisited – Modeling Rough Inductive Reasoning" 2002.
  26. A. Dydejczyk, K. Kulakowski, M. Rybak, "The norm game - how a norm fails", Computational Science, ICCS 2009 (2009) 835-844.[Comp]
  27. N. Elkies, "Higher Nimbers in pawn endgames on large chessboards", More Games of No Chance, Berkeley, 2002, 1-21 (ver "On numbers and endgames: Combinatorial game theory in chess endgames").
  28. J. Ely, "Kludgeg" 2007.
  29. B. Engelhardt, "Crime Networks with Bargaining and Build Frictions" 2008.
  30. L. Epstein, M. Marinacci, "The Core of Large Differentiable TU Games", Journal of Economic Theory 100 (2001) 235-273.
  31. N. Feltovich, R. Harbaugh, T. To, "Too Cool for School? Signalling and Countersignalling", The RAND Journal of Economics 33 (2002), 630-649. [Prof]
  32. T. Ferguson, "Who solved the secretary problem?" Statistical Science 4 (1989) 282-289 (ver E Samuel-Cahn, "When Should You Stop and what do You Get? Some Secretary Problems", The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Preprint 2005.
  33. A. Fraenkel, "New games related to old and new sequences", INTEGERS, Electronic J. Combinat. Number Theory 4 (2004) 1-18.
  34. A. Fraenkel, "Arrays, numeration systems and Frankenstein games", Theoretical Computer Sci. 282 (2002) 271-284.
  35. A. Fraenkel, "Multivision: a game of arbitrarily long play", Amer. Math. Monthly 105 (1998) 923-928.
  36. M. Francesconi, C. Ghiglino, M. Perry,, "On The Origin Of The Family" 2010
  37. E. Friedgut, G. Kalai, N. Nisan, "Elections Can be Manipulated Often", Foundations of Computer Science, 2008. FOCS '08. IEEE 49th Annual IEEE Symposium.[Comp]
  38. D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, "Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox"
  39. P. Gadea-Blanco, J. Jiménez-Gómez, M. Marco-Gil, "Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way", Preprint 2010.
  40. A. Gibbard, "Manipulation of voting schemes", Econometrica 41 (1973) 587-601 (ver A. Feldman, "Manipulating voting procedures").
  41. Z. Gorodeisky, "Stability of Mixed Equilibria", Games and Econ. Behavior 66 (2009) 191-201.
  42. O. Gossner, P. Hernandez, A. Neyman. "Online matching pennies", Preprint 2003.[Comp]
  43. S. Hart, "Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction", Games and Economic Behavior 41 (2002) 227-264.
  44. S. Hart, "A Comparison of Non-Transferable Utility Values", Theory and Decision 56 (2004) 35-46.
  45. S. Hart, "Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games" Int J Game Theory 36 (2008) 441-460 (ver Errata).
  46. S. Hart, A. Mas-Colell, "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies", Journal of Economic Theory 98 (2001) 26-54.
  47. P. Herings, G. van der Laan, D. Talman, "Cooperative games in graph structure", 2000.
  48. J. Horner, D. Rosenberg, E. Solan, N. Vieille, "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Information", Operations Research 58 (2010) 1107-1115.
  ***
  49. M. Iyigun, "Marriage, Cohabitation and Commitment", 2009.
  50. A. Kalai, E. Kalai, "A Cooperative Value for Bayesian Games", The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Preprint 2009.
  51. V. Krishna, J. Morgan, "On the Benefits of Costly Voting", Economic Working Papers 0083 (2008), Int. Adv. Study, Princeton.
  52. D. Levine, "The Castle on the Hill", Review of Economic Dynamics 3 (2000) 330-337.
  53. R. Martínez, J. Massó, A. Neme, J. Oviedo, "An Algorithm to Compute the Full Set of Many-To-Many Stable Matchings", Mathematical Social Sciences 47 (2004) 187-210.
  54. J. McKenzie Alexander, "Random Boolean Networks and Evolutionary Game Theory", Philosophy of Science 70 (2002) 1289-1304.
  55. F. Menezes, P. Monteiro, "Corruption and Auctions", J. of Math. Econ. 42 (2006) 97-108.
  56. R. Myerson, "Cooperative games with incomplete information", Differential Information Economies 19 (2005) 481-505.
  57. R. Myerson, "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game Theoretic Analysis" (1993.
  58. R. Myerson, G. Pollock and J. Swinkels, "Viscous Population Equilibria", Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1991) 101-109.
  59. R. Myerson, "Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory", Discussion paper no. 671 (1986)
  60. A. Neyman, "Bounded Complexity Justifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma", Econ. Letters 19 (1985) 227-229 (buscar paper con las demostraciones).[Comp]
  61. R. Pancs, N. Vriend, "Schellings Spatial Proximity Model of Segregation Revisited", Journal of Public Economics 91 (2007) 1-24.
  62. R. Peeters, J Potters, "Sender-Receiver Games", Tilburg University, Discussion Paper 1999-46.[Comp]
  63. T. Quint and M. Shubik, "A Bound on the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Coordination Game", Economics Letters 77 (2002) 323-327 (ver "A theorem on the number of Nash equilibria in a bimatrix game", Int. J. of Game Theory 26 (1997) 353-359)
  64. T. Quint and M. Shubik, "A model of migration", Yale School of Management Working Papers (1994).
  65. T. Quint, M. Shubik and D. Yan, "Dumb Bugs and Bright Noncooperative Players: Games, Context and Behavior", Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1094, Yale University
  66. J. Renault, S. Scarlatti, M. Scarsini, "A Folk Theorem for Minority Games", 2003.
  67. P. Reny, "Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach", Econ. Letters 70 (2001) 99-105.
  68. T. Roughgarden, "Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective", Economic Theory, 42 (2010) 193-236.[Comp]
  69. A. Roth, "The Price of Malice in Linear Congestion Games", Internet and Network Economics, Lect. Notes in Comp. Sci. 5385 (2008) 118-125.[Comp]
  70. R. Sethi and M. Yildiz, "Public disagreement", Economic Working Papers 0089 (2009), Int. Adv. Study, Princeton.
  71. J. Shalev, "Loss Aversion equilibria", Int. J. of Game Theory 29 (2000) 269-287 (ver "Loss Aversion in Repeated Games", "Loss Aversion and bargaining".
  72. L. Shapley and M. Shubik, "On Market Games", J. of Economic Theory 1 (1969) 9-25.
  73. E. Shmaya, "The determinacy of infinite games with eventual perfect monitoring", Preprint 2009.
  74. M. Shubik, "Game Theory, behavior and the paradox of the prisoners' dilemma - 3 solutions", Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 274, Yale University
  75. M. Shubik, M. Sobel, "Stochastic Games, Oligopoly Theory and Competitive Resource Allocation", Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 525, Yale University (1979).
  76. C. Tarnita, H. Ohtsuki, T. Antal, Feng Fu, M. Nowak, "Strategy selection in structured populations", J. of Theoretical Biology 259 (2009) 570-581 (ver "Evolutionary dynamics in set structured populations", PNAS).
  77. Y. Tauman, A. Zapechelnyuk, "Bargaining with a Bureaucrat", The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Preprint 2006.[GRAL]
  78. J. Taylor, "Dependence of the Parity-Condition Parameter on the Combat-Intensity Parameter for Lanchester-Type Equations of Modern Warfare", OR Spektrum 1 (1980) 199-205.[ode]
  79. D. Wolpert, J. Bono, "Game Mining: How to make money from those about to play a game", Preprint 2009. :-)
  80. Zhengzheng Pan, "Learning, Game Play, and Convergence of Behavior in Evolving Social Networks", Ph.D. Thesis, 2009 (parcial, Cap 2 uno, Cap 4 otro). [Comp]
  
  Gran Maestro:
  1. T. Adamo, A. Matros, "A Blotto Game with Imperfect Information", 2008.
  2. A. Akhmetzhanov, F. Grognard, L. Mailleret, P. Bernhard, "Join forces or cheat: evolutionary analysis of a consumer-resource system", Rapport de Recherche INRIA 7312 (2010) (ver "consumers facing cheating mutants").
  3. P. Amoros, "Picking the Winners" 2010.
  4. E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, "The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation", Found. of Comp. Sci., 45th Annual IEEE Symposium (2004) 295.304.[Comp]
  5. I. Arieli, "Backward Induction and Common Strong Belief of Rationality", en "New Perspectives on Games and Interaction", K. Apt, R. Van Rooij.
  6. R. Aumann, "Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders", Econometrica 43 (1975) 611-646.[Funcional]
  7. Y. Babichenko, "Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria", International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010) 483-502.[Comp]
  8. M. Benaim, J. Weibull, "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games", Econometrica 71 (2003) 873-903 (ver Z. Gorodeisky, "Deterministic Approximation of Best-Response Dynamics for the Matching Pennies Game", Games and Economic Behavior 66 (2009) 191-201).
  9. D. Blackwell, "Infinite Games And Analytic Sets", PNAS 58 (1967) 1837.[Real]
  .
  10. Ph. Blanchard, A. Krueger, "The Epidemics of Corruption" 2005.
  11. H. Bodlaender, "Kayles on special classes of graphs - An application of the Sprague-Grundy theory", Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Comp. Sci. Lect. Notes in Comp. Sci. 657 (1993) 90-102.[Comp]
  12. G. Bornstein, T. Kugler, S. Zamir, "One Team Must Win, the Other Need Only Not Lose", J. Behav. Dec. Making, 18 (2005) 111-123.
  13. J. Bulow, P. Klemperer, "The Generalized War of Attrition" 89 (1999) 175-189.
  14. O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar and P. Parrilo, "Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games", Preprint MIT (2010).
  15. J. Canovas, D. Lopez Medina, "Topological Entropy of Cournot-Puu Duopoly"[Real/Funcional]
  16. S. Chakravarty, T. Kaplan, "Vote or Shout", 2010
  17. G. Chichilnisky, "The topological equivalence of the Pareto Condition and the Existence of a Dictator", J. of Math. Economics 9 (1982) 223-233.
  18. G. Chichilnisky, "The foundations of statistics with black swans", to appear in Math. Soc. Sci. [Funcional]
  19. G. Chichilnisky, "On fixed point theorems and social choice paradoxes", Econom. Lett 3 (1979) (ver "Social Choice and the Topology of the space of Preferences", Adv. in Math.)[Topol]
  20. R. Datta, "Universality of Nash equilibria", Math of Operation Research 28 (2003) 424-432.
  21. M. Develin and S. Payne, "Discrete bidding games", E. J. of Combinatorics, 17 (2010) 1-31 (ver Bath, Payne, "Bidding Chess", Math. Intell. 31 (2009) 37-39).
  22. N. Dimitri, "Last minute bidding equilibrium in second price internet auctions", 2007.
  23. R. Ferriere, R. Michod, "Wave Patterns in Spatial Games and the Evolution of Cooperation" (in The Geometry of Ecological Interactions, R Law, J Metz, 318–335. Cambridge University Press 2000). [ode-pde]
  24. L. Fortnow R. Santhanam, "Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time", ICS 2010 (2010)1-12.
  25. A. Fraenkel, "Complexity, Appeal and Challenges of Combinatorial Games", Theoretical Computer Sci. 313 (2004) 393-415 [Comp]
  26. A. Fraenkel, "Games played by Boole and Galois", Discrete Appl. Math., 156 (2008) 420-427.
  27. A. Fraenkel, "Two-player games on cellular automata", en More Games of No Chance, Berkeley (2002) 279-306.
  28. A. Fraenkel, O. Rahat, "Complexity of error-correcting codes derived from combinatorial games", Computers and Games, Lect. Notes in Comp. Sci. 2883 (2003) 201-212.[Comp]
  29. A. Frieze, M. Krivelevich, Po-Shen Loh, "Variations on Cops and Robbers" 2010.[Grafos]
  30. Fudenberg, D. and D. K. Levine "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review 96 (2006) 630-651.
  31. S Goyal, F Vega-Redondo, "Network formation and social coordination", Games and Econ. Behavior 50 (2005) 178-207.[Comp]
  32. M. Grabisch, A. Rusinowska, "Measuring influence in command games", 2009.
  33. J. González-Díaz, P. Borm, H. Norde ,"A Silent Battle Over a Cake", 2004.
  34. O. Haggstrom, G. Kalai, E. Mossel, "A law of large numbers for weighted majority", Advances in Applied Mathematics 37 (2006) 112-123.
  35. J. Hofbauer, "The spatially dominant equilibrium of a game", Ann. of Operations Research 89 (1999) 233-251.
  36. B. Hoyer, K. De Jaegher, "Strategic Network Disruption and Defense", 2010.[Grafos]
  37. M. Isaksson, G. Kindler, E. Mossel, "The Geometry of Manipulation-a Quantitative Proof of the Gibbard Satterthwaite Theorem", arXiv:0911.0517 (2009).
  38. G. Kalai, "A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem", Adv. in Applied Math 29 (2002) 412-426.[Analisis]
  39. G. Kalai, "Noise Sensitivity and Chaos in Social Choice Theory", The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Preprint 2005.
  40. G. Kalai, "Social Indeterminacy", Econometrica 72 (2004) 1565-1581.
  41. G. Kalai, S. Safra, "Threshold Phenomena and Influence", The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Preprint 2005.
  42. K. Konrad. D. Kovenock, "The Lifeboat Problem", 2009.
  43. A. Ledvina, R. Sircar, "Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly", Preprint 2010.[pde]
  44. E. Mossel, "A Quantitative Arrow Theorem", arXiv:0903.2574.[Analisis]
  45. R. Myerson, "Large Poisson Games", Journal of Economic Theory 94 (2000) 7-45 (ver R. Myerson, "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games", Int. J. of Game Theory 27 (1998) 375).
  46. A. Neyman, J. Spencer, "Complexity and effective prediction", Games and Econ. Beh. 69 (2010) 165-168 (ver A. Neyman, D. Okada, "Two-person repeated games with finite automata" Int. J. Game Theory 29 (2000) 309–325).[Comp]
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  48. R. O'Donnell, "Some Topics in Analysis of Boolean Functions", 40th ACM STOC 2009 (incluye Arrow vía Fourier).[Comp/Analisis]
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